DJIBOUTI COUNTRY STATEMENT

ADDRESSING MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN EAST AFRICA

September 2017

This report is one of 10 country statement reports covering:
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen

EXPERTISE FRANCE

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RMMS Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat

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Djibouti Country Statement:

Addressing Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking in East Africa

This report is one of a series of ten country statements, produced as part of the project '*Addressing Mixed Migration Flows in Eastern Africa',* funded by the European Commission (EC) and implemented by Expertise France.

The overall project consists of three components:

- Assisting national authorities in setting up or strengthening safe and rights-respectful reception offices for migrants/asylum seekers/refugees.

- Supporting and facilitating the fight against criminal networks through capacity building and assistance to partner countries in developing evidence-based policies and conducting criminal investigations, most notably by collecting and analysing information about criminal networks along migration routes.

- Supporting local authorities and NGOs in the provision of livelihoods and self-reliance opportunities for displaced persons and host communities in the neighbouring host countries.

As part of the second component, Expertise France contracted the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) in Nairobi to implement the project *'Contributing to enhanced data collection systems and information sharing on criminal networks involved in facilitating irregular migration in the Eastern Africa region'.* This project aims to provide updated knowledge on migration trends and related issues, as well as technical assistance to partner countries on data collection, analysis and information sharing. In all the country statements, the focus is on human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

These country statements are the output of this project. They provide a technical realistic appraisal of existing data related to mixed migration, including data on trafficking; insight on routes and *modi operandi* of criminal networks involved in facilitating irregular migration; and an assessment of existing national data collection systems and government capacity to address migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The analysis highlights technical capacity gaps and challenges faced by officials in responding to such phenomena, aiding the identification of capacity building needs in the areas of data collection, analysis and information sharing.



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The research was commissioned by Expertise France, in the wider context of the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the "Khartoum Process"). The research was conducted in 2016 by an international consultant, in cooperation with national researchers under the operational management and technical oversight of RMMS in Nairobi.

The lead researcher and author of this report was Mr. Peter Tinti (an international consultant). The final English editor was Mr. Anthony Morland.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years, Djibouti has emerged as a major transit country for migrants from Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent Somalia, seeking maritime passage to Yemen. Between 2008 and 2016, an estimated 365,000 irregular migrants arrived in Yemen from coastal departure points in Djibouti, approximately 80 per cent of whom were from Ethiopia.[1]

This movement is being facilitated by migrant smuggling networks that span several countries. The value of the industry that moves migrants from Ethiopia, into Djibouti across the Red Sea to Yemen and onward to labour markets in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states is conservatively valued at a minimum of USD 4.5 million per year.

The overland journey across Djibouti, with its extreme climate and unforgiving terrain, is perilous. Migrants report being physically abused, sexually assaulted, and held for ransom during their journey. In addition to this mistreatment of migrants at the hands of their smugglers, human traffickers also operate in Djibouti, with men, women, and children trafficked internally and from abroad for the purposes of unpaid labour, sex trafficking, and debt bondage.

Limited resources and capacity in state institutions, create challenges for the Government of Djibouti in dealing with the number of migrants transiting through the country and countering the networks that are smuggling and trafficking people within Djiboutian territory.

In March 2016, however, the Government of Djibouti took an important step in combating both phenomena by passing a law against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, in line with international norms as outlined by the United Nations. In addition to this new legal framework, Djibouti has received international support to build the capacity of its law enforcement and security personnel to tackle migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks.

Despite these efforts, such capacity remains very limited, partly due to the absence of formal mechanisms for collecting, analysing and sharing data or information on migrant smuggling or human trafficking especially within and across government institutions. This challenge is exacerbated by limited resources and technical capacity in state agencies responsible for tackling migrant smuggling and human trafficking.

Government officials are realistic about what they can hope to achieve in the near term given the limited resources at their disposal, and are keen to manage the most negative impacts of mass irregular migration. In the absence of a concerted effort by international partners to help the Government of Djibouti develop new institutional frameworks, strengthen existing ones, and increase stakeholder capacity across law enforcement agencies, security services, and the judiciary, Djibouti will continue to experience challenges in successfully countering migrant smuggling and human trafficking within its territory.

1 RMMS (2016). Country Profiles: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php/country-profiles/djibouti



1.0 METHODOLOGY

This report is a qualitative study, informed by fieldwork carried out by two consultants over the course of two trips to Djibouti, and supplemented by a comprehensive desk review of primary and secondary material pertaining to mixed migration, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking in Djibouti.

In-depth, semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders and key informants formed the core of the fieldwork carried out in several locations throughout the country. Interviews took place in Djibouti City, Tadjoura, Obock, and refugee camps outside Obock. Government officials, representatives from local and international non-governmental organizations - including from the aid and humanitarian community – returned migrants, and migrant smugglers were all interviewed over the course of this project. Fieldwork was carried out by one consultant in May 2016, and by another consultant during a separate trip in July 2016.

The desk review consisted of a review of primary documents such as existing laws, combined with secondary documents, including local and international news media reports, as well as reports issued by international think tanks, research institutes, and aid/humanitarian organizations.

The issue of migrant smuggling and human trafficking remains politically sensitive in Djibouti, despite the government's public commitment to combating the networks involved. As a result, securing interviews with those working on issues of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Djibouti, particularly those from non-government backgrounds, proved challenging.

This report uses the terms "migrant smuggling" and "human trafficking" according to the definitions outlined in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). Article 3 of the convention's Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (the Migrant Smuggling Protocol) defines migrant smuggling as ," the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national." [2]

2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2004). United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

The convention's Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines human trafficking as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation." [3]

3 Ibid



2.0 INTRODUCTION

The small nation of Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa with a population of just under 900,000, has long served as a crossroads for people, goods, and ideas flowing back and forth between East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Though Djibouti lacks significant natural resources, its strategic location along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which leads into one of the busiest and most important shipping lanes in the world, combined with Djibouti's relative stability in a volatile area of the world, has enabled the government to leverage its geography into beneficial partnerships with a range of global and regional powers.

Djibouti hosts the only permanent US military base in Africa, as well as bases for French, Japanese, and Italian military forces. China is in the process of building a permanent military base in Djibouti, and several other nations, as well as private security firms, house or park military assets in the country's airport and port facilities. After Ethiopia became a landlocked country following the secession of Eritrea in the early 1990s, Djibouti became Ethiopia's de facto port, making it an indispensable conduit between the global economy and a country boasting East Africa's largest populations and the continent's fastest rates of growth.

Irregular migrants from Ethiopia, Somalia, and to a lesser extent, Eritrea, have traditionally come to Djibouti seeking maritime passage to Yemen and Gulf States via the Red Sea. Between 2008 and 2016, over 365,000 irregular migrants were estimated to have arrived in Yemen from coastal departure points near Djibouti's port city of Obock. Around 80 per cent of them are reckoned to have come from Ethiopia.[4] Beginning in 2014, there was a marked shift in migration patterns in which Somali migrants no longer sought passage through Djibouti, preferring to cross the Arabian Sea via the port city of Bossaso in Puntland, Somalia.[5] Though exact figures are difficult to obtain, numbers of registered arrivals in Yemen indicate that Ethiopian nationals comprise approximately 98 per cent of irregular migrants using Djibouti as a departure point to Yemen, with Somalis comprising the remainder. During August 2016, an estimated 2,380 (2,342 Ethiopians and 38 Somalis) migrants and asylum seekers arrived on the Red Sea coast of Yemen, aboard 41 boats from Obock.[6]

4 RMMS (2016). Country Profiles: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php/country-profiles/djibouti

5 Ibid.

6 RMMS (2016). RMMS Monthly Summary for August 2016. Available at: http://regionalmms.org/monthlysummary/RMMS%20Mixed%20Migration%20Monthly%20Summary%20August%202016.pdf

In addition to serving as a key transit hub for irregular migrants traveling to Yemen, Djibouti is also a destination country for people displaced by conflict, most notably from Somalia and Yemen. As of March 2016, there were just under 22,997 registered refugees and asylum seekers in Djibouti, with 58 per cent residing in the Ali-Addeh (11,093) and Holl Holl (2,297) refugee camps in southern Djibouti, near the border with Somalia.[7] Djibouti also hosts refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Between March 2015 and the end of July 2016 a total of 36,162 persons arrived in Djibouti fleeing that conflict.

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 19,636 of them (54 per cent) were Yemeni nationals, 14,562 (40 per cent) were transiting migrants and 1,964 (six per cent) were Djiboutian returnees.[8] According to arrival figures published by RMMS, 3,618 refugees from Yemen registered in Djibouti, including 3,359 Yemeni nationals, as of 15 August 2016.[9]

Asylum seekers coming from south and central Somalia and from Yemen are usually granted prima facie refugee status, whereas those from Eritrea and Ethiopia, who seek asylum in Djibouti in far fewer numbers, must undergo a process led by UNHCR and its government counterpart, *L'Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés* (the National Office for Assistance to Refugees and Those in Distress - ONARS) to determine their refugee status.[10]

Although Djibouti is still overwhelmingly a transit country when it comes to migration flows in the Horn of Africa, it has also emerged as a destination state for a small but growing number of domestic workers such as guards, gardeners, maids, and various low-skill jobs whom Djiboutian citizens living in the capital may consider "beneath" them and therefore undesirable.[11] These economic migrants, almost all of whom come from Ethiopia, constitute a significant pool of candidates for secondary migration. Some may arrive in Djibouti with plans to earn money in order to fund an onward journey to Yemen and the Gulf; others may decide, after months or years working in Djibouti, that better economic opportunities can be found elsewhere.[12]

In addition to these irregular migrants from Ethiopia living and working in Djibouti, tens of thousands of Yemenis and Somalis are believed to be living in Djibouti City and to a lesser extent in the cities of Obock and Tadjoura, without refugee status and outside the

7 RMMS (2016). Country Profiles: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php/country-profiles/djibouti

8 UNHCR (2016). Djibouti: Inter-agency update for the response to the Yemeni situation #45. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/djibouti/djibouti-inter-agency-update-response-yemeni-situation-45-16-31-july-2016.

9 RMMS (2016). RMMS Monthly Summary for August 2016. Available at: http://regionalmms.org/monthlysummary/RMMS%20Mixed%20Migration%20Monthly%20Summary%20August%202016.pdf

10 RMMS (2016). Country Profiles: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php/country-profiles/djibouti

11 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May and July, 2016.

12 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.



asylum-seeking process.[13] As a result of the historic economic, cultural and ethnic ties between Djibouti and Yemen, as well as between Djibouti and Somalia, many of the people fleeing violence in Yemen and Somalia have family or acquaintances in Djibouti who can provide support and facilitate access to educational and economic opportunities that exceed those available to migrants within formal refugee processes.[14] Somalis with such ties, for example, are often able to obtain official identification cards through informal processes.[15]

These irregular migrants and non-registered refugees, and even those who are registered as asylum seekers and are living in refugee camps, may go back and forth between Yemen and Djibouti depending on the time of year and changes in the security situation in Yemen. In fact, irregular migration in Djibouti now consists of what RMMS has called "bi-directional" flows in which irregular migrants and refugees in the Horn and Africa are both "pushed and pulled." [16] As will be outlined in later sections of this report, this phenomenon means that Ethiopians on their way to Yemen are likely to pass camps and settlements in Djibouti hosting Yemenis and Ethiopians who are fleeing the war in Yemen. Thus, some Ethiopians are escaping Yemen just as others are paying smugglers to go there.

The goal of this report is to update the knowledge basis of migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks that facilitate the flow of irregular migrants into and through Djibouti, with a particular emphasis on government capacity to combat these networks. In addition to providing information on how these networks operate, the report will also assess the Djiboutian government's ability to counter them, by analysing its capacity to collect, analyse, and share pertinent information in order to carry out investigations and prosecute smugglers and traffickers. In so doing, the report will also consider challenges to dealing with mixed migration flows in Djibouti. It concludes with a list of key recommendations.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 RMMS (2016). Pushed and Pulled in Two Directions, Available at: http://regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Pushed_and_Pulled.pdf

3.0 MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN DJIBOUTI

Djibouti finds itself caught in the middle of several push and pull factors that are driving bi-directional irregular migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, and vice versa. The overwhelming majority of these flows are made up of Ethiopians who enter, transit through, and leave Djibouti with the help of organized migrant smuggling networks. With limited capacity to monitor its porous inland borders and long stretches of its coastline, the Djiboutian government is trying to counter the migrant smuggling networks that facilitate mixed migration flows driven by external forces over which Djibouti has no control.

At the same time, human trafficking networks functioning in the capital, Djibouti City, as well as across the Red Sea in Yemen, are using Djibouti both as a destination country for unpaid labour and debt bondage, and as a transit country for trafficking persons abroad. This section will outline the principal route of migrants being facilitated by migrant smugglers in Djibouti, the basic structure and *modi operandi* of these smuggling networks, as well as the key trends in human trafficking in Djibouti.

Routes through Djibouti

The profile of migrants entering and transiting Djibouti irregularly for onward passage to Yemen is fairly well understood. Government officials and international non-governmental officials have regularly posited that between 95 and 99 percent of irregular, non-asylum seeking migrants in Djibouti are Ethiopian.[17] The majority are believed to be ethnic Oromos. Throughout 2016 Ethiopian migrants arriving in Yemen were almost exclusively Oromo.[18] Although Muslims comprise only about half of the Oromo population in Ethiopia, almost all of the Oromos passing through Djibouti are believed to be Muslim. Historical ties between Muslim communities in Ethiopia and Muslim Ethiopian diaspora communities in the Gulf, stretching back decades and developed around religious pilgrimages, work visas, and educational opportunities, formed the initial architecture on which irregular migration flows to the Gulf are predicated.

17 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016. Key informant interviews in Obock, July 2016.

18 Based on continuous monitoring of arrivals along Yemen's Red Sea coast by the Danish Refugee Council since 2006. Monthly figures are published by the RMMS in monthly summaries, available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/index.php/data-trends/monthly-summaries



This in part explains why Muslim Oromos are drawn to the Gulf States.[19] Additionally, the economic and political marginalisation perceived by some Oromos in Ethiopia offers another explanation of why Oromo seek work opportunities in abroad.[20]

Accurate official numbers are hard to come by because those that are available are derived only from migrants who are registered or detected, either at some point during their journey through Djibouti, or upon arrival in Yemen. The consensus among both the Djiboutian government and organizations working on issues of migrant and refugee protection is that numbers derived from official registration data and detection represent only a fraction of the actual flows through Djibouti.[21]

Contrary to the expectation that the war in Yemen (since 2015) would reduce the flow of irregular migrants from Ethiopia to Yemen, such flows through Djibouti have in fact increased. According to information shared with the author of this report by the *Gendarmerie Nationale,* irregular migration flows from Ethiopia in Djibouti have increased dramatically over the last three years. In 2013 – the first year data was made available - the gendarmerie estimated that 14,566 migrants crossed into Djibouti from Ethiopia. In 2014, that number rose to 25,000, roughly a 70 per cent increase. By the second quarter of 2016, the gendarmerie estimated that 500 migrants were entering Djibouti every day (a rate of 180,000 per year).[22] These estimates are based on the gendarmerie's own experiences, and are much higher than those based on detection and registration within Djibouti and within Yemen. Based on arrival monitoring in Yemen, it is estimated that in 2016 (until August) 13,651 migrants arrived in Yemen on the Red Sea coast (leaving from Djibouti), which at the current pace would amount to just over 20,000 per year. While the figures provided by the gendarmerie are therefore most likely to overestimate the actual number of migrants entering Djibouti, they do highlight the extent to which these flows are increasing and difficult to measure.

The majority of Ethiopians irregularly migrating through Djibouti to Yemen and onwards to Saudi Arabia are male, while female Ethiopians migrating to the Gulf States for domestic work have historically used more regular means.[23] However, government officials cited anecdotal evidence that among the groups of migrants they now stop in Djibouti, there seems to be a larger proportion of females than before.[24] The most recent data from the gendarmerie in Djibouti indicate that the majority of those entering the country were between 20 and 35 years old, and among the 35 per cent who were female, a significant

19 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016. Key informant interviews in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2016.

20 Interviews in Djibouti City and Obock, May 2016.

21 Ibid.

22 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.

23 Based on Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs figures, as quoted in RMMS (2014). The Letter of the Law: Regular and irregular migration in Saudi Arabia in a context of rapid change. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/RMMS_Letter_of_the_Law_-_Saudi_Arabia_report.pdf

24 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.

though unspecified percentage were victims of sexual assault during their journey through Djibouti, often at the hands of their smugglers.[25]

Aside from a small number of Ethiopian migrants who try to claim asylum in Djibouti, those making the journey into and through Djibouti do so in search of economic opportunities, usually in Saudi Arabia via Yemen. These economic aspirations are further reinforced with what Djiboutian authorities who interview migrants described as a "culture of migration" within source communities. "Today, we are witnessing a real 'migratory chain' which gives new hopes to entire communities, because being able to move to another country, another part of the world, is seen as an incredible opportunity," said a representative of the Ministry of Justice. "Globalisation has impacted the entire world, including in remote regions. People want mobility."[26] Migrants who are stopped during their journey, or rescued from abuse by smugglers and traffickers, regularly express an interest in continuing their journey, citing not only aspirations to go abroad, but also social pressure to succeed and not return to Ethiopia without having earned money. Migrant journeys are often funded by an entire family, who may sell property, including houses and livestock, or even go into debt, to raise the necessary money.[27]

Just as the profile of irregular migrants passing through Djibouti is generally uniform, so are the routes they take to reach Yemen via Djibouti. There are several key crossings through which irregular migrants, with the help of smugglers, can cross into Djiboutian territory thanks to porous borders, large portions of which are unguarded. Remote, sparsely populated areas are regularly patrolled by national police forces, but the Djiboutian state is otherwise almost completely absent from these desert and mountainous areas.[28]

According to Djiboutian authorities, the key crossing points are usually from where people can travel on foot from Ethiopia to a main road in Djibouti, from where they can follow the roads until they reach towns and villages. The majority of migrants are believed to cross into the Dikhil region, but also through the Ali Sabieh region and the Tadjourah region. Regardless of whether they enter from the south (Ali Sabieh and Dikhil), the west (Dikhil and Tadjourah) or the northwest (Tadjrouah), migrants, who may spend as many as 10 days on foot crossing from Ethiopia into Djibouti, will head towards Lake Assal, passing through inhospitable and difficult mountainous terrain to avoid checkpoints.

With temperatures regularly above 40°C and migrants sometimes having to go days without access to water other than what they carry, this leg of journey from Ethiopia to Yemen is widely considered the most dangerous, according to both Djiboutian officials and migrants themselves.[29] Djiboutian gendarmes conduct patrols throughout the area and regularly find, in groups, the corpses of migrants who died of dehydration.[30]

25 Ibid.

26 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City and Obock, May 2016.

30 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.



Once migrants have passed through the desert, mountains, and the area surrounding Lake Assal, they follow the road leading to the port city of Tadjoura before continuing to Obock, from where they link up with smugglers who can take them across the Red Sea to Yemen.

Migrant smuggling networks

Facilitating all of these mixed migration flows are increasingly sophisticated and organized transnational networks of smugglers stretching from Ethiopia to Yemen. The structure of these networks is consistent with the typologies outlined by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with a range of individuals having different roles within the broader network, including coordinators and organizers, recruiters, transporters and guides, and service providers.[31] Some migrants in Djibouti travel mostly on their own, only occasionally using smuggling services during their journey, while others are involved in what UNODC calls "pre-organized stage-to-stage smuggling," where services are provided by smugglers throughout their journey. [32]

According to irregular migrants who have made the journey all the way to Yemen, as well as Djiboutian officials who have interviewed smugglers, the majority of smugglers operating in Djibouti are Ethiopian, primarily from the Afar tribe.[33] As recently as three years ago, Ethiopian smugglers would guide migrants on foot across the border into Djibouti, until they reached the first major town or road from where the migrants could reach Obock. Once in Obock, migrants would again seek smuggler services, often having been given contact information by their smugglers in Ethiopia, in order to reach Yemen by boat.

According to interviews with Djiboutian authorities and migrants, this sort of irregular migration, partly facilitated by smugglers but also carried out unaided by migrants who figure out their own way from one point to another, has since given way to much more streamlined journeys with smugglers involved – even if not always physically escorting - during each step.[34] "Smuggling networks are [now] extremely well-connected and organized; there is a path to follow, which smugglers make migrants go along according to a fairly well-defined itinerary," with little, if any improvisation, explained one official in the Ministry of Justice.[35] "We don't like to say this, we don't want to admit it, but today we have to fight against real professionals with easy access to technology and means to carry out their dark schemes," said an official in the Ministry of Interior tasked with collecting intelligence on migrant smuggling networks. "They are no dodgy 'DIYers' [DIY meaning 'Do it yourself'], contrary to what some people might think." [36]

31 UNODC (2010). Issue Paper: A Short Introduction to Migrant Smuggling. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Issue-Papers/Issue_Paper_-_A_short_introduction_to_migrant_smuggling.pdf

32 Ibid.

33 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City and Obock, May and July 2016.

34 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City and Obock, May 2016.

35 Key informant Interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.

36 Ibid.

There are several indications that as flows of irregular migrants have increased and drawn greater scrutiny from Djiboutian authorities, smuggling operations have adapted. The first is the extent to which payment methods have been, in the words of one Djiboutian official, completely "de-materialised." For example, the Ethiopian smugglers acting as guides from the Ethiopian border through the Lake Assal area used to carry large sums of cash collected from migrants and used to pay the next smuggler in the chain and to pay bribes if necessary. But these stacks of cash made it easy for authorities, when they found a group of migrants, to discern who among them the smuggler was. Plus the cash tended to be confiscated.[37]

Now, the smugglers that accompany migrants do not carry large amounts of money on them and instruct migrants to do the same. Rather, they guide the migrants from one predesignated point to another, with different smugglers acting as guides at each leg. Before each leg, migrants are given a phone number to memorise, which they will call once they have reached the "checkpoint" designated by the smuggler. The person on the other end will instruct the migrants to go to a certain business or small shop, where a contact can confirm with other contacts back in Ethiopia that the migrant, or the migrant's family, has paid for the next leg of the journey. Some migrants will have prepaid for the entire journey to Yemen, in which cases the phone calls are simply a matter of verification. Others, who pay in instalments, take the opportunity to tell their family to pay for the next leg. The designated shop owner or contact at the "checkpoint" will liaise with his associate back in Ethiopia to confirm payment has been made before they can start the next leg of the journey.[38]

According to government sources, these payments are facilitated by businessmen and shop owners who operate informal financial transfer services, known throughout the region as *hawala* transfers.[39] Under *hawala* schemes, cash does not need to change hands so frequently or be physically transported. Instead, the migrant or his family pay a *hawala* trader in Ethiopia, for example, who then calls his counterpart in Djibouti instructing him to dispense funds to the recipient. The responsibility for settling debts, therefore, is between the *hawala* traders, who might do so via reverse transactions or within the context of other business transactions. The informality of these transactions, in which there is rarely any sort of paper trail, makes them virtually untraceable.

An official in the Ministry of Interior noted that the majority of *hawala* traders facilitating payments along the Ethiopia-Djibouti-Yemen chain are ethnic Somalis with long established business relationships, many of which are predicated on kinship and trust built on decades of transferring money between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.[40] Djiboutian authorities also have strong indications, based on material confiscated from smugglers, including notebooks and cell phones, that the networks of Somali *hawala* traders extend into Yemen and Saudi Arabia, from where sizeable Somali communities maintain business dealings with other communities throughout East Africa and the Horn.[41]

37 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

38 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City and Obock, May 2016.

39 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.



Beyond the *hawala* traders, the broader people-moving networks involve individuals from a range of backgrounds and with varying degrees of criminality are involved, Djibouti government sources explained. "Here in Djibouti, we have individuals that we would associate with petty crime rather than transnational organized crime (trying to take 'basic' goods from a point A to a point B, generally between Djibouti [city], Tadjoura and Obock). So there is no particular ethnic group to pinpoint," said a representative in the Ministry of Interior focusing on organized crime and migrant smuggling.

"In Ethiopia for instance, the situation is much different because we are then talking about harmonised, structured and organized networks. It is actually very simple; they are like mafia members, specialising in different types of organized crime activities. There is no real standard profile: they are people who decided to be against the law, sadly also sometimes against fundamental human rights principles," the official said.[42]

Since the leg of the journey between Ethiopia and Obock has effectively become cashless, with migrants only carrying small amounts of money, smugglers have been able to further "dematerialise" their activities and take fewer protective measures. Interviews with migrants indicated that some smugglers might carry handguns or long knives to coerce and control migrants, but that such weapons are almost always concealable, allowing smugglers to better blend in with migrants when they are walking in public view.[43] According to the gendarmes, when they spot a group of migrants and decide to intervene, smugglers might simply ditch their weapons and run with the crowd.[44]

Once in Obock, smugglers work with crews who can navigate dhows across the Red Sea to Yemen. In most cases, migrants spend several days, or even weeks, waiting to be driven to departure points north of Obock, or waiting on the beaches exposed to the elements. Migrants who have already paid are loaded onto the boats, usually in groups of 40 to 50. In cases where there will be smugglers in Yemen to receive the migrants, some are permitted to pay on arrival. These schemes are risky, however, from the migrant perspective, as those arriving in Yemen already indebted to their handlers are particularly vulnerable to abuse and extortion.[45]

Prices for the migrant-smuggling journey vary according to a range of factors, including weather, time of year, availability of boats, fuel prices, as well as recent crackdowns and other government activities. Estimates obtained during the course of this research from migrants, smugglers themselves and other sources were somewhat inconsistent, in part because of these variables, but also because individual sources tended to be most familiar with just one part of the journey, rather than its entirety.

A government official in charge of investigating migrant smuggling networks said that, on average, a trip from Ethiopia through to Saudi Arabia costs migrants between 60,000 to

42 Ibid.

43 Key informant interviews in Obock, May 2016.

44 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

45 Key informant interviews in Obock.

100,000 Djiboutian francs (between USD 330 and USD 550).[46] Monthly summaries published by RMMS provide similar estimates, with Ethiopian migrants arriving in Yemen from Djibouti reporting they usually paid in the range of USD 200-500 for the journey from Ethiopia to Yemen (but not Saudi Arabia).[47]

A driver who works for a smuggler moving migrants from Djibouti City to Obock, however, put the cost of the trip from the capital to Yemen at just USD 140-170. According to this driver, the price is lower for these migrants because they have already made it to Djibouti City, where many have lived for months, if not years. As a result, they do no need to pay for smuggler services to cross the border into Djibouti and reach urban areas safely. Rather than hire a guide and arrange provisions, as a smuggler would to facilitate a crossing from Ethiopia, moving migrants who are already in Djibouti City only requires a 4X4 vehicle that can be driven off-road to avoid checkpoints if necessary. In most cases, however, smugglers leaving from Djibouti City can go through checkpoints without incident, as driving people along the main highway is unlikely to raise suspicion.[48] Similarly, because the particular driver referred to above worked for a transport company that engages in a range of legal enterprises, including providing transport for tourism agencies and aid/humanitarian organizations, he has established relationships with many of the people who work at these checkpoints.

Before reaching the last checkpoint approaching Lake Assal, where authorities do often check to make sure those headed north have correct identification, drivers make migrants disembark, bypass the checkpoint on foot, and meet up with the vehicle a few kilometres up the road. When he arrives in Obock, the driver has a series of phone numbers provided by his boss that he can call to inform whoever is on the other end that he has a group of migrants who want to go to Yemen.[49] Although the breakdown of payment structures within migrant smuggling networks differs depending on the route and the network involved, in this particular case, the driver said that of the initial USD 150-170 that a migrant must pay to go from Djibouti City to Yemen, about USD 45 goes to the driver per trip, and USD 20-30 per migrant goes to the boat owners who transport them across the Red Sea. According to this driver, the rest of the money goes to his boss.[50]

With so much money to be made, co-opting locals to work within migrant smuggling networks, in either an ad hoc or a more formal basis, is relatively easy. "There are no jobs here... If you are a fisherman for instance, you can consider yourself lucky if you make 1,000 Djibouti francs [USD 5.50] per day," noted a representative from the Ministry of Interior, citing that a fisherman working as a smuggler can easily earn ten times that per day, and that dhow owners can earn several thousand dollars per trip.[51] Although the amounts migrants pay to smugglers vary, and the number of migrants transiting through Djibouti

46 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.

47 RMMS (2016) RMMS Monthly Summary for August 2016. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/monthlysummary/RMMS_Mixed_Migration_Monthly_Summary_June_2016.pdf

48 Key informant interview in Obock, May 2016.

49 Ibid.

50 Key informant interview in Obock, May 2016.

51 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.



are only estimates, even if one conservatively posits that every year 15,000 migrants will transit from Ethiopia to Yemen through Djibouti, and that each one pays a an average of USD 300, the migrant smuggling industry along the Ethiopia-Djibouti-Yemen corridor would be valued at USD 4.5 million.

Indirect participants in this economy, according to Djiboutian officials, include rural communities near the Ethiopian border which provide lodging for migrants and sell them food, bottled water and other provisions such as telephone sim cards and air time credit. Smugglers use these towns and villages in order to store and purchase supplies. As a representative from the Ministry of Interior pointed out, obtaining provisions like food and water in Djibouti is costly, and requires a significant budget and detailed planning on behalf of smugglers.[52]

Revenue generated from the smuggling industry also enters the broader economy through laundering and investment. Most of the money, according to interviews with officials in the Djiboutian government as well as interlocutors in Obock, is laundered and reinvested into vehicles and construction. As well as serving to launder illicit income, such investments facilitate both legitimate and illegitimate activities. New cars, for example, can be used both to smuggle migrants and for more lawful purposes, while new properties are sometimes used temporarily to consolidate and house migrants in advance of a departure.[53] Djiboutian government officials indicated that some smugglers offer passage from Ethiopia to Obock in brand new 4x4 vehicles, the better to escape authorities should they be detected.[54]

The conspicuous consumption related to migrant smuggling revenues is readily apparent in Djibouti, Tadjoura, and Obock and even north of Obock, where large houses and new vehicles are increasingly visible. Interviews with people from north of Obock confirmed that young people from that area aspire to get into the very lucrative business of moving migrants across the sea, having seen its tangible, economic benefits. One person interviewed as part of this research said she personally knew young people from her hometown who decided to drop out of school in order to become smugglers.[55]

Human trafficking

Although human trafficking and migrant smuggling in East Africa and the Horn of Africa often overlap, particularly when the relationship between migrant and smuggler transitions from one of "client-service provider" to one in which the smuggler seeks to extort or abuse the migrant, most human trafficking believed to be taking place in Djibouti is understood to occur independently of the flows of Ethiopians seeking passage to Yemen.

According to irregular Ethiopian migrants in Djibouti returning from Yemen, the risk of being trafficked in Yemen is considerable, and most pronounced upon arriving in that

52 Ibid.

53 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City and Obock, May 2016.

54 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

55 Ibid.

country, and during onward journeys to other Gulf countries, rather than inside Djibouti.[56] The risks of human trafficking are particularly acute for those who arrive having agreed to pay the smugglers on arrival. Women in particular find themselves at risk of being forced into sexual slavery and debt bondage (in some cases servicing local militias and state militaries) while men are forced into manual labour.[57] There have also been indications that several thousand women and girls "disappear" upon arrival in Yemen.[58]

There are increasing reports that Ethiopian men are being recruited, and in some cases forced, into the ranks of militias and armed groups participating in the conflict in Yemen. Sources in Yemen confirmed that such active recruitment was taking place, as local militias covet young Oromo men who are "cheaper" than recruits from Somalia.[59]

There was also anecdotal reporting among interlocutors in Djibouti that migrants from Ethiopia may be abused, beaten, and sexually assaulted while waiting at the designated "checkpoints" for payments from family abroad to be paid or verified. It was unclear whether such scenarios are part of a dedicated kidnap-for-ransom or extortion scheme, or designed to intimidate family members back home to pay as quickly as possible. Furthermore, these types of activities exist within the grey area between smuggling and trafficking, as extortion followed by release, absent exploitation, may not meet the technical definition of trafficking. Gendarmes interviewed during this research said that women among the groups they intercepted regularly cited being threatened with sexual abuse if they could not pay, and others said they were victims of sexual violence regardless of payment.[60]

Human trafficking taking place within Djibouti is most prevalent in Djibouti City. According to the 2016 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, Djibouti is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking, and is considered a "Tier 3" country, meaning that the government neither meets the minimum standards to combat human trafficking in the country nor makes significant efforts to do so.[61]

The most common victims of trafficking believed to be taking place in Djibouti (the lack of prosecutions for human trafficking means that concrete numbers do not exist), are women and girls being subjected to domestic servitude and sex trafficking in Djibouti City and Obock. Ethiopian women in particular are used to staff bars, hotels and nightclubs, many of which arrange to have these women sent to Djibouti under "contracts" in which they are indebted to the owner. These bars and nightclubs are frequented by Djiboutian nationals

56 Key informant interviews in Obock, July 2016.

57 Key informant interviews in Obock, July 2016.

58 RMMS (2014). Abused & Abducted: The plight of female migrants form the Horn of Africa in Yemen. Available at: http://www.regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/Abused___Abducted_RMMS.pdf

59 RMMS (2016). Yemen Country Statement: Addressing migrant smuggling and human trafficking in East Africa.

60 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

61 US State Department (2016). Trafficking in Persons Report: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258757.html



as well as expatriates, including those working in the shipping industry, contractors on foreign military bases, as well as truck drivers who work along the main corridor linking Djibouti City to Ethiopia.[62] Government officials maintained that bar and nightclub owners, for example, will "order" women from Ethiopia to staff their businesses. Most of those who come to Djibouti from Ethiopia know that they will be working in a bar and nightclub, and many might be aware that sex-work is part of the job.[63] Not all of the women, therefore, might necessarily be victims of trafficking, although the extent to which they are free to quit their job or choose which activities they wish to partake in is often unclear.

Immigrant children, especially those from Ethiopia but also Somalia, are widely believed to be forced into street begging, child labour, and sexual exploitation. According to the US State Department, "some of Djibouti's older street children reportedly act as pimps of younger children. Parents sometimes force their children to beg on the streets as a source of familial income; children may also travel from foreign countries—including Ethiopia and Somalia—for begging in Djibouti." The same report notes that "children are also vulnerable to forced labour as domestic servants and, at times, coerced to commit petty crimes, such as theft."[64]

Residents of refugee camps, particularly those from Somalia, but Yemenis as well, are also believed to be vulnerable to traffickers, who offer them jobs as housekeepers in Djibouti to lure them into what turns out to be unpaid labour or street begging. Traffickers also target urban refugees and those who have left camps to find work in cities.[65]

62 Ibid.

63 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.

64 US State Department (2016). Trafficking in Persons Report: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258757.html

65 Key informant interview in Djibouti, May 2016.

4.0 THE DJIBOUTIAN GOVERNMENT'S FRAMEWORK TO RESPOND

Government framing of the issues

Human rights organizations as well as the US State Department have expressed their concern over the Djiboutian government's perceived inability to tackle human trafficking and migrant smuggling within its territory.

Regarding human trafficking, human rights organizations, as well as the US State Department, have been particularly critical. After several years on the Tier 2 watch list, the US State Department downgraded Djibouti to Tier 3, despite the fact that Djibouti passed a new anti-trafficking law in March 2016. Reasons cited for the downgrade included the country's failure to: use existing laws to prosecute traffickers; "investigate any potential sex or labour trafficking cases or initiate prosecutions of any suspected trafficking offenders;" prosecute officials complicit in trafficking crimes; and "fully operationalize its national action plan to combat trafficking, which it finalized during the previous reporting year." [66]

Furthermore, the US State Department report said that the Djiboutian government, aside from amending its national anti-trafficking law, had "made minimal law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking," and had "sustained inadequate efforts to protect trafficking victims."[67] During field work, government officials cited a lack of training, capacity, and resources as reasons for its inability to tackle human trafficking within Djibouti.[68]

On the issue of migrant smuggling, government officials suggested that the suite of policy options available to the Djiboutian government was limited by the fact that Djibouti is a transit state, and that external events in Ethiopia and Yemen significantly set the parameters of what the Djiboutian government can hope to achieve. Several interviews with high-level government officials, for example, stressed the need to be realistic on the matter of irregular migration. "I don't think we will ever stop migration; it is impossible," said one official, who stressed the fact that Ethiopia's rapidly growing population combined with the pull of job opportunities in Saudi Arabia means there is little Djibouti can realistically accomplish without the help of Ethiopia and the Gulf States.[69] Other officials within the Djiboutian government reiterated this sentiment, with some saying that the Ethiopian government is tacitly encouraging its people to go

66 US State Department (2016). Trafficking in Persons Report: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258757.html

67 Ibid.

68 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016 and July 2016.

69 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.



abroad in search of employment, and that the Gulf States have tacitly agreed to accept them into their labour markets.[70]

The prevailing view among Djiboutian authorities is that as a transit country, migration flows through Djibouti are not a primary security or economic concern. "Djibouti is not really affected by this phenomenon compared to other countries because we are a transit country," one official stated. "That being said, I think we can also do something as a transit country. We should be able to help curb these activities, take actions to reduce the impact they have on different spheres of the society".[71]

With these sober assessments in mind, the Djiboutian government has started to view the issue through the lens of security, which, in conjunction with unprecedented international attention on issues related to irregular migration and migrant smuggling, has galvanised forces within the Djiboutian government. The current posture is very much one of managing the impact of irregular migration and migrant smuggling within Djiboutian territory, rather than seeking to curb the activity altogether.

During an official presentation given to the author of this report by the *Gendarmerie Nationale*, for example, migrant smuggling networks were described as a "military" threat to Djibouti. "The criminal networks responsible for this are encouraged and supported by warlords. Organized crime networks are expanding because a drug, human, or weapon trafficking ring might hide behind a migrant smuggling one," the presentation stated. "Various types of organized crime intertwine and it makes it even more difficult for us to identify people, who might also be exposed to terrorism."[72] Djiboutian officials also expressed concern that the large Yemeni and Somali refugee population, rather than irregular migrants from Ethiopia, posed a potential security threat. As a country that hosts several foreign military contingents which conduct operations in Somalia and Yemen, there is a concern that some of those seeking shelter in refugee camps, both from Yemen and Somalia, may have ties to violent extremist organizations or might be recruited into terrorist organizations.[73] Ever since an attack on a Djibouti City restaurant popular with foreigners by Al-Shabaab in 2014, Djibouti has reinforced its focus on its counter-terror activities domestically, in an effort to maintain its status as a preferred host for foreign military bases and maritime commerce in the region.

The presentation by the *Gendarmerie Nationale* also described migrant smuggling networks as a potential threat to the economy, citing the key crossing of Galafi, from where trucks loaded with high value goods such as petrol, pass between Djibouti and Ethiopia. The presence of organized criminal networks in this area, and their use of these routes, the presentation suggested, threatened the economic "lungs" of Djibouti.[74] Several government officials, including the gendarmes, also pointed to their funding problems in dealing with irregular migration, and noted a lack of a dedicated budget to deal with the processing, protection, and transportation of migrants. The responsibility to pay for caring for migrants

70 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016 and July 2016.

71 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.

72 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, July 2016.

73 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016 and July 2016.

74 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

often falls on whichever institution (police, army, gendarme, coast guard, etc.) happens to detect them. Authorities also expressed concern that irregular migrants, particularly Oromos from Ethiopia, were coming to accept blue collar work at very low rates, pricing out Djiboutian citizens from that labour market.[75]

Djiboutian authorities also described irregular migration as a "humanitarian" challenge, in which even if resources were available and roles and responsibilities clearly defined, dealing with migrants would still constitute a serious logistical challenge spanning several different sectors. "When we find migrants, some of them might have contracted serious diseases, are wounded, or in very serious health conditions from the hostile environments they travelled through," said the *National Gendarmerie* during its presentation. Other Djiboutian officials explained that housing and receiving refugees and irregular migrants comes with public health challenges, especially in the realm of water and sanitation.[76]

Lastly, Djiboutian authorities pointed to the influence of foreigners on local culture, traditions, and religious practices as one of the threats posed by irregular migration. In some cases, this threat was described in xenophobic terms ("Ethiopian women corrupting Djiboutian men with their sexual promiscuity," for example) but domestic anxiety toward an influx of foreigners, not only in the form of irregular migration, but also the presence of foreign military contingents, is an increasingly pressing political issue in Djibouti. Some of these anxieties undermine the Djiboutian government's willingness to host and devote resources to large refugee and migrant populations going forward.[77]

The main preoccupations of the domestic security apparatus are the protection of the current regime and counter-terrorism. While the *Service de Documentation et de Securité* is by no means an "all-knowing" domestic spying agency, it does rely heavily on human intelligence and boasts a wide array of full-time and part-time informants throughout the country.[78] This aspect can impact positively in the fight against human trafficking. As several observers noted, in a country as small as Djibouti and with smuggling activities in the areas around Obock taking place in plain sight, many within the government and society will be aware of their existence. This points to potential collusion between smugglers and some individuals within certain state institutions, which may pose a challenge in fighting smuggling networks.[79] According to representatives within the Ministry of Justice, combating migrant smuggling is starting to become more of a priority because there is a concern that failing to manage it now might allow it to become something more difficult to tackle later.[80]

75 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, July 2016.

76 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City and Obock, July 2016.

77 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

78 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.

79 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, Tadjoura and Obock, May 2016, and in Djibouti City and Obock, July 2016.

80 Key informant interviews in Djibouti City, May 2016.



4.1 Legal and institutional frameworks

The Djiboutian government passed a new law against migrant smuggling and human trafficking in March 2016, defining "migrant smuggling" and "human trafficking" in terms similar to those outlined in the supplemental protocols to the UNTOC, to which Djibouti acceded in 2005.[81] Government authorities were previously operating under a 2007 law based on legislation that did not clearly define either human smuggling or human trafficking.

To help draft the law, the Government of Djibouti consulted international trafficking experts. The new law is called *Loi N°133/AN/16/7è L sur la lutte contre la traite des personnes et le trafic illicite des migrants*. (Law 133 "On the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons and Illicit Smuggling of Migrants"). In addition to defining migrant smuggling and human trafficking, the March 2016 law calls for the protection of victims, and outlines punishments for those found guilty of smuggling and trafficking.[82]

The new legislation repeals a 2007 law covering human trafficking and migrant smuggling, but *Loi n°111/AN/11/6ème L relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et autres infractions graves* (Law 111 "Regarding the Fight Against Terrorism and Other Serious Crimes"), passed in 2011, remains in effect and also prohibits all forms of trafficking and outlines punishment for trafficking offenses. Not only are there discrepancies in how these two laws define trafficking, they also differ in the penalties prescribed, which, according to the 2016 US State Department report, "may create confusion, raise legal issues, and make it difficult for law enforcement and prosecutors to implement the law effectively.[83]

To coincide with the new legislation on migrant smuggling and human trafficking, the Government of Djibouti convened a roundtable in July 2016 attended by the attorney general, state prosecutors, judges, police officers, gendarmerie officers, civil society organizations, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR. According to organizers, the objective was to familiarise relevant government officials with the content of the law, and to further educate them on the topics of migrant smuggling and human trafficking.[84]

According to the Ministry of Justice, the new law is being rolled out following four guidelines and directives. The first is an awareness-raising campaign, which includes making sure government officials understand the law and teaching them how to explain it to the general public and civil society organizations, including youth, women, religious leaders, universities, rural populations and other key demographics.

81 Présidence de la République de Djibouti (2016). Loi N°133/AN/16/7ème L du 24 mars 2016 portant sur la lutte contre la traite des personnes et le trafic illicite des migrants. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/101766/122772/F253643777/DJI-101766.pdf

82 Ibid.

83 US State Department (2016). Trafficking in Persons Report: Djibouti. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258757.html

84 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, July 2016.

The second includes capacity building, which is described as a multi-agency "crosscutting effort" approach to building the capacities of all government actors involved. The third directive is to focus on sub-regional cooperation with states and organisations such as IGAD to facilitate working together to tackle transnational issues. Finally, the fourth directive focuses on protecting victims of human trafficking, ensuring that the relevant authorities are familiar with this concept, understand how to identify victims and the issues they face, and are aware of the processes available to assist them in voluntary return and repatriation.[85]

In addition to these efforts, the Djiboutian government established a coordinating national committee on migration and trafficking, which brings together officials from the ministries of interior, foreign affairs, and justice, as well as from various security services such as the army, coast guard, gendarmerie and intelligences agencies. Several UN agencies as well as international NGOs are also members.

Another important institution in terms of addressing mixed migration flows more generally is the Djibouti Mixed Migration Taskforce (MMTF) initiated by UNHCR, *L'Office national d'assistance aux réfugiés et sinistrés* (ONARS) and non-governmental agencies. As with most MMTFs in the region, Djibouti's is co-chaired by IOM and UNHCR and includes other UN agencies as well as international NGOs such as the Danish Refugee Council. The Migration Response Centres (MRC) primarily run by IOM in Obock but also in Djibouti City, provide assistance to irregular migrants, including victims of human trafficking. In addition to providing basic care, MRCs also help with voluntary returns to countries of origin. IOM works closely with governments in the region including in Djibouti, to support a series of MRCs in different locations along migration corridors. The MRCs are set up around IOM's institutional priorities of (1) protecting migrants' basic rights; (2) addressing irregular migration drivers; (3) promoting safe, orderly and dignified human mobility, countering migrant smuggling and people trafficking; (4) developing partnerships for growth and competitiveness; and (5) supporting governments as they build their capacities to respond to mixed migration.

4.2 Government structures to collect, analyse and share information

Although Djibouti has made considerable progress in updating its legal frameworks to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking, its government's ability to collect, analyse and share information about both phenomena, remains limited due to a lack both of formal coordination mechanisms and of capacity in funding, equipment and human resources.

At present, according to government officials in Djibouti, there is no functioning framework or mechanism for collecting and maintaining information on mixed migration flows and irregular migration. The main law enforcement and military institutions involved in the fight against migrant smuggling include the national police, the gendarmerie, the army, the coastguard, and to a lesser extent, the navy. There is no formal mechanism in place for sharing information on migrant smuggling or human trafficking between these institutions.

85 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, July 2016.



Additionally, the national security services under the Office of the President, which collect intelligence focused on protecting the regime and counter-terrorism, do not share information with other government institutions.[86]

In addition to this lack of appropriate mechanisms, officials across the whole of government frequently cited a dearth of equipment and resources as a hindrance to adequately collecting information. The *Gendarmerie Nationale*, for example, does not have the capacity to maintain a presence in areas where crossings from Ethiopia into Djibouti, and onward in remote areas often take place. The two types of material most lacking, according to interviews with gendarmes, are trucks and more advanced telecommunications equipment which would enable them to patrol the remote areas through which smugglers lead migrants on foot when they enter Djibouti irregularly. The gendarmes also stressed that they would need a dedicated budget for countering migrant smuggling and human trafficking specifically, as the resources currently at their disposal do not cover the costs of fuel necessary to patrol the hinterlands where smugglers operate.[87]

Similarly, the gendarmes currently have limited capacity to deal with groups of migrants that they intercept in the hinterland, and need large transportation vehicles that are capable of moving massive quantities of provisions, such as food, water, and blankets, to migrants in remote areas, as well vehicles to transport them to reception centres. In particular, the gendarmes stressed a need to establish reception shelters around Lake Assal in order to assist migrants more effectively, and to dedicate more resources to the already existing shelter in Obock.[88]

Sources within the gendarmerie also suggested that if proper facilities were available to provide protection and assistance to irregular migrants, their trust would be gained, making it easier to collect information and intelligence from them.[89]

Officials within the Djiboutian government readily admit that institutions that are tasked with combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking are under-resourced, and stressed a need for financial support from the international community. But other sources, including some in government, suggested that human capacity and structural changes were just as important.

According to a representative within the Ministry of Interior, the lack of capacity to deal with migrant smuggling stems from poor management and organization as much as it does from insufficient resources and material. "We have the police, the army, the gendarmes, but they are not distributed evenly on the ground. We would also need special units that are specifically trained to combat this type of criminality," the representative explained. "In my opinion, given the situation, training is more important than equipment because if you have the equipment but you don't know how to use it and what for hence the importance

86 Key informant interviews, Djibouti City, May 2016.

87 Ibid.

88 Key informant interviews, Djibouti City, May 2016.

89 Ibid.

of explaining what organized crime is, then you are wasting your time."[90] Some interlocutors felt that focusing aid and support on human capacity was a better investment in countering criminal networks.[91]

To that end, Djiboutian authorities also stressed a need for specialised units within security structures. Over the course of interviews conducted, officials proposed the establishment of different units to focus specifically on organized crime, human trafficking, human smuggling, trafficking of children, sexual violence, and forensics. Beyond citing a need for these capacities, there was little consensus regarding which parts of Djibouti's security apparatus would house these units.[92]

The above challenges are further compounded by the fact that prosecuting smugglers is difficult, and requires capacity and coordination across several institutions. Security forces that intercept a migrant convoy may not know the laws under which they are operating, and have not been trained to understand the new anti-migrant smuggling and human trafficking law passed in March 2016.[93]

Few of the law enforcement officials dealing directly with migrants and migrant smugglers have a sound understanding of the types of evidence and information to be collected in order to successfully mount a prosecution. In some cases, humanitarian imperatives, such as getting food, water, and medical assistance to migrants, might overtake the process. In others, lack of knowledge regarding basic interview protocols is often lacking.

When a group of migrants is stopped, the procedures for processing them are unclear and the type of information collected, if any is, depends heavily on the individuals who have intervened.[94] If there was a uniform system for collecting and sharing information for example, authorities might be able to establish who among the groups are smugglers, especially if a system of fingerprinting was in place.[95] Since those in the field, working at the operational level, are often overwhelmed by the sheer number of migrants they encounter, information gathering is often done in haste or bypassed altogether. According to an official at the Ministry of Justice, almost all the files they receive on migrant smuggling activities from the field are incomplete and lack sufficient information to prosecute smugglers who have been detained.[96]

Finally, the Migration Response Centres (MRC) in Obock and Djibouti City may play an important role in collecting information and data on mixed migration in general, and on smuggling and trafficking in particular. In addition to providing a forum to assist migrants and build government capacity, the MRCs afford an opportunity to capture key information from irregular migrants. The MRCs are the frontline where IOM and the government interact

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Key informant interview in Djibouti City, May 2016.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.



directly with migrants, which generates a wealth of information and data. IOM has developed a 'MRC Data Collection System' to support the governments in the MRCs with data collection. This system is a smart phone-based application that allows for migrant profiles and protection needs to be identified and organized in a comprehensive and region-wide manner. The set-up, training, and roll-out of this system was completed during an August 2016 meeting in Hargeisa, attended by MRC staff from Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Puntland and Sudan.[97]

Outside assistance

In addition to humanitarian and development assistance from a range of international donors, Djibouti has received some outside assistance that pertains directly to strengthening government capacity to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking.[98]

In 2009, IOM inaugurated a new immigration office for Djibouti's national police at the border post of Gelafi at the Djibouti-Ethiopia border. The facility, which was determined as a need in an IOM technical assessment, was a USD 25,000 project funded by the European Commission and the United Kingdom. According to OM programme manager, the border post was intended to "help officials manage migration more effectively and to address irregular migration and human trafficking."[99]

In 2011, IOM, the United States Department of Justice and UNHCR hosted a conference on combating human trafficking and protecting victims in Djibouti. The conference sought to promote national counter-trafficking strategies, which take a "victim-centred approach to investigation and enforcement." It also sought to "reinforce regional cooperation and uniform approaches to combatting human trafficking."

In 2012, IOM trained immigration, police, and coastguard officials on migration and border management in a "first of its kind" course that aimed to "increase the capacity of government officials to respond to organized trans-national crime, including human smuggling and trafficking in persons." The Government of Japan and the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund paid for the training.[100]

In addition to these conferences and capacity building exercises, IOM gave two patrol boats, and lifesaving equipment, including life jackets, blankets, first aid kits, medicines, body bags and radio equipment to Djibouti in 2013. The initiative, which sought to strengthen the capacity of the Djibouti coast guard to provide emergency lifesaving assistance to migrants and asylum seekers, was part of an IOM-managed project funded by the Japan

97 IOM (2016). Migration Response Centre (MRC) Regional Meeting, Hargeisa, 9-10 August 2016.

98 IOM (2009). IOM Inaugurates New Immigration Facility in Djibouti. Available at: https://www.iom.int/news/iom-inaugurates-new-immigration-facility-djibouti

99 IOM (2011). Conference Focuses on Greater Protection of Trafficked Victims in Djibouti. Available at: https://www.iom.int/news/conference-focuses-greater-protection-trafficked-victims-djibouti

100 IOM (2012). IOM Trains Djibouti Immigration, Law Enforcement Officials. Available at: https://www.iom.int/news/iom-trains-djibouti-immigration-law-enforcement-officials

International cooperation Agency.[101] Also in 2013, IOM and the Djiboutian public prosecutor in charge of trafficking issues trained a group of 75 officers from Djibouti's national police, gendarmerie, and coast guard in combating human trafficking. The Government of Japan and IOM's Development Fund funded the course.[102]

More recently, in 2015, 25 senior Djibouti officials and members of the security forces took part in an IOM training on international migration law and child protection. The training was facilitated by experts from OM and was part of the European Union (EU)-funded IOM child protection program.[103]

Djibouti also receives ongoing support from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as part of its project on Strengthening Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Ethiopia and Djibouti. The project, receiving EUR 849,278 in funding from the EU, aims to assist the governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti in "strengthening their capacity to provide protection to presumed victims of human trafficking, prosecute traffickers and smugglers, in a coherent and well-coordinated manner in line with international standards and norms." It also aims to "strengthen cooperation between Ethiopia and Djibouti in the area of prevention and prosecution of cases related to Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants."[104] As part of this project, in May 2015, UNODC held two training workshops from 18 to 21 May in Addis Ababa intended to "strengthen Ethiopia's and Djibouti's legislations" against migrant smuggling and human trafficking and to bolster cooperation between the two countries. The project is supported by the EU and the US State Department.[105]

101 IOM (2013). Djibouti Government receives equipment to boost rescue at sea capacity. Available at: https://www.iom. int/news/djibouti-government-receives-equipment-boost-rescue-sea-capacity

102 IOM (2013). Djibouti officials undergo training in counter trafficking. Available at: https://www.iom.int/news/djibouti-officials-undergo-training-counter-trafficking

103 IOM (2015). IOM Trains Djibouti Partners in International Migration Law, Child Protection. Available at: https://www.iom.int/news/iom-trains-djibouti-partners-international-migration-law-child-protection

104 UNODC (nda). Strengthening Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Ethiopia and Djibouti. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/brussels/en/cjr-ethiopia.html

105 UNODC (2015). UNODC fosters joint action against human trafficking and migrant smuggling.



5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

- Develop a formal mechanism for sharing information and intelligence between the relevant law enforcement and security institutions, and between security institutions and the judiciary.
- Develop a uniform system of collecting data and information on migrant smuggling that feeds into a centralised database; train relevant security personnel in the basics of collecting this data so that the format of information collected is the same across state institutions.
- Train everyone involved in the process, from "detection to prosecution," in what information is required in order to prosecute a smuggler or trafficker; ensure all relevant parties understand the basics of Law No. 133.
- Amend Law No. 111 to have the same definitions of human-trafficking, and the same proposed punishments as Law No. 133.
- Significantly increase the capacity of domestic security forces to maintain a persistent presence beyond its few outposts, forming mobile units that can credibly and effectively monitor terrain where migrant smugglers operate.
- Significantly increase the ability of domestic security forces to deliver humanitarian aid to remote areas.
- Establish more migrant reception centres in remote areas, particularly near key crossings from the Ethiopian border, and in the areas surrounding Lake Assal.
- Create a dedicated budget, with multi-year funding, for combatting migrant smuggling networks, with resources allocated according to the institutions responsible for carrying out these activities.
- Expedite the process of implementing and operationalising national action plans to combat human trafficking and migrant smuggling.
- Follow through with arrests and prosecutions of those responsible for human-trafficking in Djibouti City.
- Develop programming and frameworks to combat corruption and collusion within the ranks of state officials dealing with migrants.
- Consider alternative mechanisms to law enforcement measures in combatting migrant smuggling networks, potentially by pressuring local elites and businessman to cease smuggling related activities or including them in coming up with a plan to mitigate the negative impact of being a transit country.

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

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ANNEX

CHALLENGES AND NEEDS OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

This analysis emerged from a consultative workshop held on December 8, 2016 with representatives from the National Committee on Migration and Trafficking, and from frontline agencies involved in combatting trafficking and smuggling. Expertise France facilitated this exercise, with support from European Union, police experts from the French Ministry of the Interior, the *Direction de la Coopération Internationale,* and the Italian Ministry of Defence's *Carabinieri.* The aim of the consultation was to review the country research and analyse the institutional needs for capacity building and training.

Summary of the findings

1. Review of the country statement by national institutions

The project director presented the study carried out by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) on the current state of Djiboutian agencies' response to the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons. The presentation of this study enabled participants to digest and discuss the information provided by RMMS.

Discussions focused on the following points:

- Djibouti is a transit country for migrants heading to the Arabian Peninsula. It is an island of stability surrounded by areas and dynamics of tension (such as the conflict in Yemen, political instability in Ethiopia in 2016, and the long-running conflict in Somalia). Recent political developments in the region, the deterioration of environmental conditions, and the socio-economic situation of countries in the region, are all factors affecting the stability of Djibouti through the proliferation of migratory flows. The implementation of the Khartoum Process (which aims at establishing a continuous dialogue for enhanced cooperation on migration and mobility) is vital to the stability of the country.

- Djibouti's authorities have made a significant effort to effectively combat the trafficking and smuggling of migrants in accordance with the Palermo Protocol. Djibouti has enhanced its legal arsenal by recently adopting Law 133, complementing Law 111, in order to coordinate the actions of law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions to bring about more effective action. The legislation provides for



information campaigns, capacity building, greater cooperation with regional states and with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, and for improved protection for victims of trafficking. Law 133 is the latest legal tool created to effectively and comprehensively combat criminal networks involved in trafficking and smuggling of migrants.

- Criminal networks have "transnationalised" their actions, creating a need for in-depth collaboration with countries sharing borders with Djibouti. The sharing and harmonisation of information on the practices and definitions relating to the status of migrants are priority actions for Djiboutian security forces and neighbouring countries. The fight against these criminal networks is carried out at three levels: within the national territory, at the borders, and beyond the borders. Regional cooperation, similar to that embodied in the EU's FRONTEX agency, is strongly desired as a means to achieve greater efficiency at the regional level.

- The prevalence of migration is not sufficiently quantified by reliable statistics (estimates of the number of migrants passing through Djibouti between 2008 and 2016 range between 360,000 and 600,000). There is currently a project implemented by IOM in collaboration with ONARS to produce more reliable data. Control of migratory flows requires a better understanding of the phenomenon by improving the data collection system and centralising the data collected by the national committee on migration and trafficking. The creation of a centralised, secure and accessible database for the various agencies in charge of combating of smuggling and trafficking is a priority.

- There is an increasing risk of irregular migration from Djibouti to the European Union. The pressure exerted by migrants on the local labour market leads some young graduates from Djibouti to emigrate. Awareness campaigns and the creation of socio-economic opportunities could help stem these emerging flows. Moreover, the money generated by the smuggling of migrants leads many Djiboutian youths to become involved in the industry themselves. Awareness campaigns should be carried out accordingly.

- The security forces currently play a humanitarian role in protecting victims of trafficking. This can undermine their primary role of maintaining order and security. Assistance should be given to the security forces to help them refocus their work on the fight against smuggling and trafficking in persons. In addition, centres dedicated to the reception of victims of trafficking should be set up as a priority.

2. Challenges and capacity needs

Workshop participants were divided into three discussion groups to identify the needs and challenges of key institutions engaged in the fight against trafficking and smuggling of migrants. The three areas of discussion were:

- The strategic direction required to strengthen response capacity.
- Needs analysis on collecting and managing information.
- Needs analysis on investigations and judicial procedures.

A need for capacity building and training emerged from these three lines of discussion. Participants were also asked to identify potential training needs. **Four aspects** were identified as key priority needs for capacity building:

Information collection and sharing

- Participants pointed to the lack of technical, material and human resources for information gathering. The current acquisition of information about migrants is ill-suited to an effective response to transitory migration flows and to creating detailed profiles of intercepted migrants. What means are currently available could be better distributed along identified migration corridors.

- There is a lack of human resources for collecting information. The recruitment of intelligence officers (police or civilian) would lead to a better understanding of the *modi operandi* of the criminal networks and would facilitate the activities of law enforcement agencies working against these networks.

- Within the national territory and especially along migration corridors, security forces lack the equipment needed to register migrants' biometric data. The collection of information on migrants in these migratory transit areas would allow better profiling of migrants by law enforcement officials.

- In order to effectively carry out criminal investigations into trafficking and trafficking networks, law enforcement agencies should acquire dedicated equipment to facilitate their reports and criminal analysis, as well their collection, management, and storage of evidence.

- Police personnel have little insight into the actions and responsibilities of agencies working with vulnerable migrants, such as ONARS, international organisations and civil society groups. Mapping these organisations and their competences, coupled with creating a standardised operational procedure to guide migrants towards the appropriate entities, would improve the operational capability of law enforcement bodies to carry out their primary task of maintaining order and security by relieving them of their humanitarian activities.



- There are no specialised units within the security forces to combat the trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Neither are there any personnel specifically trained to deal with migrants or to conduct interviews of vulnerable populations such as unaccompanied minors and women.

- There are currently no specialised structures for detaining suspected smugglers and traffickers or for housing intercepted migrants. *A Centre d'Accueil et de Réception des Migrants* (migrant reception centre) is expected to be set up soon and this should accommodate the needs of law enforcement agencies in conducting investigations and gathering information. In addition, the centre should provide accommodation for unaccompanied minors and facilities for victims of sexual violence.

- Police cooperation with Ethiopia already exists, in the form of an annual meeting of the border committee. However the Djiboutian authorities believe this cooperation should be strengthened to better coordinate the fight against criminal networks.

Data management

- Participants recommended better coordination of information and evidence. There are currently multiple databases that need greater interconnection so as to improve the access of different services dealing with smuggling of migrants and human trafficking to relevant information. The various databases (run by the police, gendarmerie, national security, immigration and IOM) should be centralised with a secure interconnection under the coordination of the national committee.

- There is a lack of capacity to manage, store and use evidence on the smuggling of migrants and on trafficking networks. Structural work is required to standardise the inventory, storage and retrieval of evidence to help the criminal justice system prosecute crimes.

Analysis & reports

- Specialised software for the forensic analysis of information should be introduced to help law enforcement and criminal justice agencies plan and conduct their operations.

- Participants identified a need to reinforce their analytical reporting systems, especially those related to migrant profiling, so that relevant agencies can better protect the most vulnerable populations.

Policy and strategic planning

- The national committee should be given more financial and material resources to allow it to optimise its coordination role.

- Identifying criminal networks requires standardising the collection and recording of data relating to financial movements. It is imperative to strengthen the legislative framework regarding financial transfers.

- In the context of the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration, visa facilitation for the Schengen Area was mentioned in the workshop, with participants pointing to the dearth of visas granted to students and businessmen as a driver of irregular migration flows from Djibouti. Relaxing visa regulations would encourage more regular migration, it was suggested.

- Abuse is prevalent in the asylum application system. It is necessary to strengthen the capacity of agents responsible for determining the status of migrants in accordance with the various conventions on migration and refugees.

- The massive presence of migrants in Djibouti generates environmental, health and security risks for host populations. The impact of this presence should be analysed in a methodological and well-documented way so as improve response to the risks. Host populations should be involved in mechanisms for information sharing and the protection of migrants.

- There is no operational mechanism for the exchange and analysis of information at the regional level. IGAD could serve as a coordination structure between the security services of the various countries in the region. IGAD could play a greater role in monitoring and evaluating regional processes and recommendations.

3. Training needs and priorities

Workshop participants recommended:

- Specific training and sensitization of police units on issues of smuggling and trafficking in persons (specific module during training + continuing training in field units)

- Specific training for law enforcement officers in the territorial units to meet the needs of vulnerable people (such as victims of sexual gender-based violence and unaccompanied minors). Training of female officers and agents in interviewing unaccompanied minors.

- Mapping of the actors present in Djibouti in charge of protecting migrants and creating a standardised operational procedure for referring migrants to appropriate services according to their profile.



Conclusion

Through the development of a new legal framework, the Government of the Republic of Djibouti has made significant efforts to address irregular migration and related issues. However, the current lack of material resources and standardised processes remains a challenge for the agencies tackling irregular migration. The government has taken important decisions, such as to create a reception centre for migrants, which will improve the collection of data on migrants and will relieve the gendarmerie and other security forces from their humanitarian activities. Civil society and law enforcement agencies should be better informed and familiarised about relevant legislation, specifically laws 111 and 133. Finally, there is an urgent need to address the lack of material capacity among law enforcement agencies to improve their coordination.

Institutional challenges and priority needs

Topics/ issues	Gaps & challenges	Existing framework/ response
Information collection and referral	**Lack of standardised referral of smuggling of migrants (SoM) and trafficking in persons (TiP) cases** • Insufficient data on suspected smugglers and traffickers • Insufficient data on migrants transiting through Djibouti and victims of trafficking (VoT) • Lack of coordination or centralised mechanisms for data collection and referral of victims of trafficking • Lack of tracking of financial movement related to SoM (e.g. *Hawala*) • Lack of standardised procedures for collecting and sharing information from testimonies **Lack of technical (forensic materials and hardware) and human resources (investigation teams & specialised units to deal with issues related to SoM and TiP) to collect efficiently data on migration flows** **Lack of reactivity from the institutions/organisations for referral and care of vulnerable migrants**	National Committee on Migration and Trafficking National Committee on Migration and Trafficking/*Gendarmerie Nationale/ ONARS/* Immigration services International Organisations/CSOs/ ONARS
Data management	**Lack of centralised Information Management System (IMS)** • No centralised data records and follow-up on VoT due to multiple existing databases • Insufficient tracking records of smugglers and traffickers • Lack of interconnection between existing databases • Lack of sustainable forensic records	National Committee on Migration and Trafficking/security forces/ line ministries Law 133/National Committee on Migration and Trafficking
Analysis & reports	**Insufficient reporting and analytical mechanisms for TiP and SoM** • Lack of information and understanding of migration patterns and trends (SoM and TiP) • Lack of information for legislators, MPs and the National Committee	National Committee on Migration and Trafficking National police/gendarmerie/ immigration services/Ministry of Justice/Ministry of Interior/ONARS

Topics/ issues	Gaps & challenges	Existing framework/ response
Strategic planning	**Lack of regional response and cooperation on SoM and TiP, particularly with Ethiopia** **Lack of appropriate response in key areas affected by smuggling and trafficking** • Limited identification of key routes and corridors used for TiP and SoM, including specific periods, entry and exist points • Unequal or insufficient presence of technical and logistic resources in most areas affected by smuggling and trafficking • Insufficient funding for key institutional response, including at national and state levels. • Planning & operational process **Accountability and effective use of law enforcement and other institutional responses**	Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ IGAD/ borders committee ONARS/Ministry of Interior/ National Committee on Migration and Trafficking/IOM Counter-trafficking Law 133

Training priorities

Topics /issues	Priority needs	Training needs
Information collection and referral	**Establish mechanisms and procedures for collecting and sharing information across government departments, ministries and agencies to harmonise the methodology of data collection and statistical analysis** • Enhance knowledge for the identification and referral of suspected smugglers and traffickers • Enhance knowledge for identification and referral of cases of trafficking and smuggling between national and state levels and within law enforcement agencies • Creation of a reception centre for migrants • Better protection services for migrants • Better cooperation between organisations in charge of migrants and police forces • Improved collection of data • Improved protection for VoT and collection of testimonies	**Key aspects of procedures and standards operational procedures in investigating TiP and SoM** • Collecting and documenting data on smugglers and traffickers (how to collect profiling data) • Identification and referral VoT and witness (patterns of the needs/ mapping existing services/ identification of type of criminal offenses) **Build the capacities of the soon-to-be-established Reception Centre for Migrants** *(Centre d'Accueil et de réception des migrants).* • Training on the identification/ information/definition of cases of economic migrants. • Creation of a contingency planning • Strengthen the capacities of the existing Obock MRC • Strengthen the operational capabilities of forces on the ground (with a focus on referral of TiP/SoM cases)
Data management and records	**Establishment of IMS, including appropriate platform and database** • Records and database for suspects and convicted smugglers and traffickers • Records and database for VoT • Security protocol and SOPs for confidential data **Creation of a forensic laboratory/ Better management of forensic materials**	**Capacity and resource to establish a harmonised IMS (why, what and how)** • Record identity and establish profile of suspects and convicts of SoM and TiP • Record identity and establish profile of VoT • Protection and security of confidential data (e.g. witness and victim identity and testimony) Training on managing and recording forensic resources and materials (best practices to record and secure)

Topics /issues	Priority needs	Training needs
Analysis & reports	**Improve analytical and reporting system** • Develop information products, sensitisation and reports to state and national levels leadership • Conduct profiling exercises and mapping of available services for VoT and migrants with protection needs	**Training on analysis and reports on TiP and SoM** • Reporting on TiP and SoM. • Profiling and reporting situation of irregular migrants and victims of trafficking/use of evidence based data
Strategic planning	**Improve coordination, planning and operational management:** • Mapping of priority areas of intervention • Better allocation of existing technical resources • Establishment of funding requirements for technical materials and training needs **Establish a monitoring and evaluation system for public intervention in response to TIP and SoM**	**Training on coordinated strategic and operational planning** • Mapping of intervention • Identification and deployment of technical resources • Budget planning and management • Strategic and operational tools and reports **Monitoring and evaluation of intervention** (Methodology for accountability and impact)

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This report is one of a series of ten country statements, produced as part of the project *Addressing Mixed Migration Flows in Eastern Africa*. These reports provide an updated overview of migrant smuggling and human trafficking trends and dynamics and the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in facilitating irregular migration. The reports also highlight capacity gaps and challenges faced by governments in the region in responding to these phenomena, informing the identification of capacity-building needs in the areas of data collection, analysis and information sharing. The project is managed by Expertise France and is funded by the European Commission in the context of the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the Khartoum Process).

This report is one of 10 country statement reports covering:
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